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The relationship between the UK and the European Court of Human Rights is once again in the
news. On the 22th May last, the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court delivered its judgment
in Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), Application No. 126/05. This decision marks a potentially decisive
moment in the long-running saga of prisoner voting rights. In essence, the Grand Chamber
reaffirmed its ruling in Hirst v UK (No. 2) that a blanket and indiscriminate prohibition on
prisoners voting was not in conformity with Article 3 of the First Protocol (the right to free
elections). However, it also recognised that states enjoyed a wide margin of discretion when it
came to regulating the circumstances in which prisoners should be entitled to vote. In particular,
‘Contracting States may decide either to leave it to the courts to determine the proportionality of a measure
restricting convicted prisoners’ voting rights, or to incorporate provisions into their laws defining the circumstances in
which such a measure should be applied’, as long as they refrain from imposing ‘any general, automatic and
indiscriminate restriction’ (see para. 102 of the judgment).
In other words, the Hirst decision has been upheld, but the UK has been given room to manoeuvre in how it
responds to this requirement. However, the UK government must bring forward legislative proposals to amend the
existing blanket ban within six months. If it does not, then in accordance with the Court’s ’pilot’ judgment in Greens
and M.T. v UK, the 2500 pending cases before the Court on this issue will be ‘unfrozen’, which in turn may expose
the UK to multiple claims for damages.
The judgment in Scoppola has been excellently analysed in depth by a number of commentators: see in particular
Adam Wagner’s posting on the UK Human Rights Law blog, Carl Gardner’s analysis at Head of Legal and Marko
Milanovic’s comment on the judgment on the EJIL: Talk blog. As Joshua Rozenberg has argued, the Court has
effectively extended an olive branch to the UK government, which it might be wise to accept. However, the judgment
has also attracted the usual media outrage, as examined by ObiterJ on Law and Lawyers, with the Daily Mail
describing the decision as representing ’Contempt for Democracy’. The Prime Minister has stated at Question Time
in the House of Commons that the will of Parliament should prevail over the views of the Strasbourg Court on this
issue (H. C. Debs. 23 May 2012, col. 1127), while Jack Straw and David Davis have in a letter to the Daily
Telegraph called on Parliament to defy Strasbourg.
It appears therefore as if no easy resolution to the stand-off on prisoner voting rights between the Court and the UK
is yet in sight. It has been just over one month since the Brighton Declaration, where as Mark Elliott has discussed
on this blog the UK joined the other state parties to the ECHR in affirming the crucial role played by the Strasbourg
Court in protecting human rights and rule of law across Europe and committed itself to respecting judgments of the
Court. (See in particular paragraph 3 of the Declaration, which states in unambiguous language that [w]here the
Court finds a violation, the State Parties must abide by the final judgment of the Court’.) The UK government thus
appears to have got itself into a tangled mess. Its words and deeds in respect of the ECHR appear to be getting
dangerously out of synch. Even if legislation amending the blanket ban on prisoner voting is laid before Parliament
within the six month time-limit imposed by the Court, the Prime Minister’s comments will certainly have fortified
parliamentary opposition to making any concessions on this issue. As things stand, the UK is still locked on a
collision course with Strasbourg, unless a dramatic political change of direction takes place.
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Much of the hostility directed towards the Strasbourg Court is based on a visceral distaste of giving prisoners voting
rights. Famously, even contemplating this idea appears to make the Prime Minister nauseous. Given the quasi-
sacred status accorded to the idea of universal franchise within the UK constitutional order (the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty is now justified on the basis that the House of Commons is elected by popular vote), it is
perhaps odd that Strasbourg’s mild request for amendment of the blanket disenfranchisement imposed on prisoners
has attracted such a backlash. However, the rights and wrongs of this issue have been discussed before on this blog
by Jeff King.
What has not been discussed in detail here or elsewhere is the argument made by Jack Straw MP, David Davis MP,
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Dominic Raab MP and others that the Strasbourg Court is acting in a constitutionally
illegitimate manner in insisting on a repeal of the blanket ban on prisoners voting, and that it would be a violation of
democratic principles for the UK to defer to the decision of an unelected international court on such a manner. This
argument drives much of the opposition to the Court’s rulings in this context. It also explains why David Davis and
Jack Straw in their above-mentioned letter to the Telegraph have described these judgments as infringing ‘our
constitutional rights’. It even underscores the call by Pinto-Duschinsky, Raab and others for the UK to consider
withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the Court and/or from the Convention, which they argue would be a necessary
and justified step if the Court fails to mend its ways and exercise greater self-restraint.
This argument that it is ‘constitutionally illegitimate’ for Strasbourg to rule against the UK on the blanket ban on
prisoners voting is based on two distinct but inter-related elements. First of all, it assumes that the European Court
of Human Rights has gone beyond the legitimate scope of its authority by treating the Convention as a ‘living
instrument’ and adopting a teleological interpretative approach to its provisions. In its eyes of its critics, the original
drafters of the Convention never intended it to be read in this way: as a result, the Court is abusing its authority
when in a decision such as Hirst it interprets the right to free elections in Article 3 of the First Protocol as extending
to cover the right to vote. Secondly, the assumption is also made that it is contrary for democratic principles for the
UK to bind itself to follow the determinations of an unelected body such as the Strasbourg Court. However, both
these assumptions are open to challenge.
To begin with, the argument that the Court is going beyond its mandate is open to question. As Danny Nicol has
argued, the travaux préparatoires of the ECHR make it clear that there was no consensus among the original
negotiators that it should be read in a narrow and minimalist manner (‘Original Intent and the European Convention
on Human Rights’ (2005) Public Law 152-17). Furthermore, international treaty instruments such as the Convention
are usually expected to be interpreted in a purposive manner, not by reference to the original intent of their drafters.
In their letter to the Telegraph, Davis and Straw state that the job of the Court ‘is to apply the principles of the
Convention as originally intended by those who signed it – nothing more, nothing less’, and go on to say that the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that ‘international treaties must be interpreted as their drafters
intended’. However, this appears to be a straightforwardly incorrect interpretation of international law. The provisions
of the Vienna Convention are notoriously vague: however, Articles 31 and 32 make it clear that courts should focus
on the ‘object and purpose’ of treaties, and that the intention of the drafters can only ever be taken into account in a
‘supplementary’ manner. The ‘living instrument’ approach adopted by Strasbourg is very similar to that adopted by
other human rights bodies, as well as by constitutional and supreme courts in Europe and across the
Commonwealth. Of course, views will differ on whether the Court got it wrong when it decided Hirst, Greens and
Scoppola. However, it is by no means obvious that its overall interpretative approach is ‘illegitimate’.
Secondly, the argument that it is undemocratic for the UK to defer to decisions of the Strasbourg Court can also be
challenged. The UK consented to the jurisdiction of the Court and voluntarily undertook to abide by its decisions.
This would appear to be completely compatible in principle with the principle of democratic self-governance and
national sovereignty: as Jeremy Waldron has commented, ‘[p]art of the point of being a sovereign is that you take on
obligations’. Furthermore, as previously noted, Parliament is under no constitutional obligation to give effect to a
Strasbourg judgment: it can choose to disregard any judgment of the Court, or even to withdraw from the
Convention, at any time. If it does so, the UK may experience strong diplomatic pressure to change its mind from
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other states. Its international credibility may also be fatally undermined by a refusal to respect a judgment of the
Court, as this would call into question its commitment to the principles of human rights and rule of law which it
consistently demands that other states respect. However, Parliament, not Strasbourg, retains the final say.
This means that the current relationship between the UK and the Strasbourg Court would seem to be entirely
compatible with democratic principles. The fact that the UK faces considerable pressure to comply with Hirst,
Greens and Scoppola does not mean that the Court’s role under the Convention is illegitimate or anti-democratic: it
simply reflects the fact that the expectation that Parliament should respect international law, human rights and the
rule of law may at times require it to exercise its powers differently from how it would if left to its own devices. If
anything, the Strasbourg Court could be seen as playing a positive role in enhancing British democracy: as Richard
Bellamy (no lover of judicial supremacy) has argued, it helps to protect the rights of those who do not enjoy effective
access to Parliament and the political process. It also helps to link democracy in the UK to democratic progress
elsewhere, and makes possible a convergence of standards which elevates rights protection, democracy and the
rule of law across the Council of Europe zone as a whole.
None of these objections constitute a full and complete answer to the Court’s critics. Neither do they establish a
complete case as to why Parliament should defer to the Court’s views on prisoner voting. Opinions will inevitably
differ as to when Strasbourg has crossed the line between law and politics, or when it has made a questionable
decision. However, the claim that the Court’s position on prisoner voting rights is ‘constitutionally illegitimate’ seems
to be seriously open to debate.
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